Spinoza denounced the History and its official chronology until the 17th century

Spinoza denounced the History and its official chronology until the 17th century

Andreu Marfull

January 17, 2021 (original text of September 7, 2020)

Spinoza denounced the History and its official chronology until the seventeenth century (chronologia.org)

Reading the book Tractatus Theologico-Politicus (2012) (*), by Baruch Spinoza (or Benedict Espinosa), requires putting on special glasses to see its background. Why? Well, because throughout the book there is no reference to the official historical time (it is timeless) and it mixes biblical facts with those of the Middle Ages, making reference to the Hebrew nations of antiquity and those of medieval Europe as if of the same idea it was. And what is more, it tells us that the Bible is wrongly located in time and narrates some closer events that refer to a much shorter real time. And seeing in it an intention (which must have it) requires special lenses.

In the century XVII (the official), books are published that have become major figures of History were every year are cited in abundance and even official documents are extracted from royal files. But Spinoza gives us an extraordinary dissertation on human history, which makes us transcend the past, and does not quote us any year referred to the official chronology, and no century. On the other hand, it is a story that, at first glance, can be said (according to Spinoza) does not have a millennial past. It is current, because it refers to a very current, religious and monarchical problem that plagues all of Europe. Spinoza finds himself in a pre-enlightened and absolutist, imperial setting, where the Supreme Pontiff has fallen, and the nations are all immersed in warlike conflicts of all kinds.

Spinoza tells us of an era in which a single law governs, that of God, where a Supreme Pontiff is in charge of preserving it, while some Princes govern the nations with the active participation of the communities, to whom they are due. Seen like this, we all think with the Middle Ages. This triple power, with a parliamentary society that feels equal in rights before the Prince and the Pontiff (because God establishes that we are all equal before Him) is an evidence in the Middle Ages. Princes and counts, and also kings and emperors, in many places in Europe, create and participate in this balance of powers, and we all think of the Pope, and with the parliaments or senates of Roman tradition. But, for some reason, it does not speak of the  Middle Ages but refers to the biblical Hebrew State, the one before the Babylonian captivity of the people of Israel (officially) more than two thousand years ago.

That is, Spinoza does not differentiate the ancient Hebrew order from the medieval Christian one. It seems to tell us (with the obvious) that the medieval European order is the Jewish one. At no time does he say that he is not, and in a very well elaborated way he lets us know by describing the medieval order bluntly as if it were the original Hebrew state. That is why he does not place us with precise dates, at any point in the book, when he refers to the Hebrew State. It is only supported by the sacred text.

In Spinoza’s book, Princes, Supreme Pontiff and States, in the form of pious nations of God, as if it were the Middle Ages, are mixed with the constitution and subsequent collapse of the Hebrew State (which is born with the occupation Canaan) as if this was our recent History. That is, it makes us a carbon copy of what official History tells us happened between the eighth and fifteenth centuries after Christ, in which nations and parliamentary forms were born, and communities organized and governed with the authority granted to a prince, count or king that they authorized, within the framework of a more global order supervised by a high pontiff. Spinoza tells us what official History has transformed in the Middle Ages until the appearance of absolutist imperialism, which begins in the 16th century and worsens in the 17th and 18th centuries. So everything is out of context, apparently.

Following the academic consensus, Spinoza’s book deals with the problem of religious reform in Europe (in the seventeenth century), which it leads to the emergence of a revolution towards the secular state. A deep analysis is made of the pros and cons of the Hebrew and Christian orders, as well as the powers of the States, the monarchs, the pontiffs, the religions and the nature of the sacred texts, making the idea of God (understood as a natural law of things) the way to restore the social pact necessary to keep all nations united, in peace. In this sense, it is a great work, extraordinary. But there is also an issue which is not be talking but can discern. It tells us about the history of human civilization, which has the Hebrew imprint in the East and the West until the seventeenth century.

As the main idea, it highlights that the beatitude of God is that of the natural order, and that before it we are all equal. He says (p. 139):

Given, then, that the law is nothing more than the form of life that men impose on themselves or others for some purpose, it seems that it is necessary to distinguish human law and divine law. By human law I understand that way of life that only serves to keep life and the State safe; by divine law, on the other hand, that which only refers to the highest good, that is, to the true knowledge and love of God.

In this line, along the book is a profound idea to build peace based on piety and religion, as long as they kept to the practice of equity and charity, while the right of the supreme powers should refer to the actions. The rest you have to leave it to the freedom to think and say what you think (p. 424). He says (p. 415): “The true purpose of the State is, then, freedom.” According to him, freedom appears with the cultivation of the arts and sciences, good education, the integrity of customs and virtue (p. 419). And he adds that the more freedom is granted to men, the closer the State is to natural law, and with less violence it is governed (p. 421). Or, put another way (p. 414):

The most violent state will therefore be the one in which everyone is denied the freedom to say and teach what they think.

Spinoza announces the idea of ​​a united nations, which while it is his turn to live are not so for religious and monarchical reasons. Also, being a philosopher of Sephardic origin who became an atheist, he maintains a very personal position on the future of the Jews. A anticipating the reality of the twentieth century, he states (p. 134):

(…) one day the Jews, when presented with the chance (So mutable are human things!), will rebuild their state and God will again choose.

In 1948, after the founding Assembly of the United Nations in 1945, the State of Israel became the rediscovered Hebrew State. On the other hand, Spinoza insists that no nation is distinguished from another in the face of true virtue, and that none is chosen by God with preference (p.135). In fact, following his line, which aspires to a return towards the authority of natural law (which he assimilates with God), Spinoza clarifies that the Jews of today have nothing that can be attributed to being above all nations (p. 133), despite its prophetic tradition, which, as it emphasizes, has never been peculiar to the Jews. As he says, the Hebrews were concerned with writing the things of their prophets, and not the other peoples (p. 126).

According to Spinoza, love of God is the supreme happiness and bliss of man, understood as the ultimate goal of all human actions (p. 140). In doing so, he references the Judeo-Christian tradition, but he also bridges the Christian idea of ​​the New Testament. He says “natural divine law”, and makes it universal and common to all men (p. 142). According to him, Christ, unlike Moses, did not propose anything other than to teach the universal law and distinguish it from the laws of the State (pp. 154-155), following the thread preached by Jesus. Later (p. 385), he affirms that “God has revealed, through the apostles, that his covenant is no longer written with ink or with stone plates, but with the spirit of God to hearts.” On this line, add (p. 311):

Moses did not try to convince the Israelites by reason, but to bind them with the alliance, oaths and benefits and, later, he threatened the people with penalties and exhorted them with rewards to obey the laws; and all these means are not intended for science, but for obedience.

With this reference to obedience he refers to the sacred texts, which he calls into question. And he does it not only with those of the Old Testament, but also with those of the New. He treats all books the same in his strict analysis. Regarding the oldest sacred books, in Chapter VIII of the book it states that the entire Pentateuch (which covers from Genesis to Deutoronomy, which Moses is said to have written), plus the following books of Joshua, Judges, Ruth, of Samuel and of the Kings, were the work of a hand that compiled them later, without much criterion, and they were narrated as ancient (p. 234). It points to the scribe Ezra, that the official story makes a priest who returns from the Hebrew captivity of Babylon. Said (p p. 234, 238):

all of them [the books] were written by the same historian who wanted to write the ancient history of the Jews, from the origin to the first destruction of the city [p. 234]. (…) [The historian] ” limited himself to collecting stories from various authors and, at some time, writing them in an elementary way, and he left them to posterity without having examined or ordered them [p. 238].

Spinoza finds multiple anachronisms, errors, and repetitions. And all these evidences, as well as the simplicity of the structure and the intentionality, give it away. That is, it makes the departure from Egypt in the time of Moses, and even the previous past of Adam, Noah, and Abraham themselves, a book written with an intentional narrative from the time of Alexander the Great, more or less. Spinoza denounces the inventive capacity of the rabbis (pp. 249-250), as well as the erroneous idea that they have of the perfection of the texts. He complains that they see divine providence and that there are even those who (erroneously) think that the traces of the letters hide great secrets. He sees it as an excess of devotion. And, regarding the marginal notes that the rabbis write the texts, which become the Talmud, he says that they are based on the will to want to see some mystery (p. 253). Otherwise, it does not leave Kabbalists in a good place. He says of them (sarcastically): “I have even met some Kabbalists, fond of jokes, but I have never managed to sufficiently admire their madness” (p. 251). Ultimately, Spinoza explains, in full detail, that all these stories (referring to biblical facts) have never yet been ordered or duly examined (p. 249). He says that nobody has proposed it. And, to make it very clear, he clarifies (p. 250):

(…) I do not write anything that I have not meditated long and repeatedly and that, despite having been imbued from my childhood in the current opinions on Scripture, I could not help but admit what I have just said.

Later, chapters IX and X complement the criticism of the rest of the books, and in Chapter XI, dedicated to the New Testament, he goes so far as to affirm that the gospels could never be written by fishermen or ordinary people, but by learned priests, preachers (p. 282).

Spinoza leaves the sacred idea of ​​History in the air, and points to the misuse that has been done. But he also denounces what the power erected by Moses has become, whoever he was, as long as he really was. On the first page of the book, Spinoza denounces that religion has been adorned with a pompous ceremonial that gives it prestige at all times and assures it maximum veneration, leaving reason damaged. And, in the same way, it says that (p. 64):

(…) the great secret of the monarchical regime and its best interests are to maintain deceived men and disguise, under the magnificent name of religion, fear with which wants to govern, to fight for their slavery, as if it were their salvation, and consider it not an ignominy, but the highest honour, to give their blood and soul for the pride of one man.

Spinoza, in this context, refers to all kings, including Jews, who have nurtured a religion that has moved away from the Law of God, and from the ability to transcend freedom. But in a special way he rebels (at the beginning of the book) at the cruelty and malevolence of Christians, who then declare that they profess love, joy, peace and happiness for all in the name of the Christian faith. He says (p. 66):

(…) the same temple degenerated into a theater, where ecclesiastical doctors were no longer heard, but orators, carried away by the desire, not to teach the people, but to attract their admiration. 

He sees it as an evil, to which he adds everyone, also Turks and Jews, and complains that the faith has become little more than credulity and prejudice (p. 67).

For this reason, for his subversive capacity in the face of the polarized positions of the time, and for daring to question the authority of the entire symbolic construct instituted, in a sensibly convulsed context, Spinoza was severely criticized and threatened.

Spinoza criticizes religion and the monarchy, but claims his authority and obedience to God. For this reason, after defending them as arms of States that, following the natural law, of God, must govern jointly with the citizens, over States in which all are equal, and no one is superior to anyone. But following certain roles. Some preserve the value of equity and charity; others the judgment of the shares, based on these values; and the rest is freedom.

What Spinoza wants is to save religion and the State (the subtitle of the original book says so), understood as an essential political form for healthy coexistence, and he exclaims of the zeal of princes and high pontiffs, even citizens, who compete for power, they betray the law of genuine consensus and, if necessary, call the people to sedition, when it suits them, leading the state and religion to their ruin.

In other words, Spinoza clearly tells us that the powers have been corrupted, and that they must be rebuilt by reinterpreting History. In fact, it literally tells us to start with the Bible itself. It must be rethought in its entirety, in the seventeenth century. But with a fundamental peculiarity that nobody has paid attention to: Spinoza does not tell us that it is seventeen centuries ago that the Second Temple in Jerusalem fell, nor that the Bible has been written centuries ago. In his book there is no Middle Ages, nor was there a certain Constantine, or a Charlemagne. None of this is collected by him. Reading it, anyone who did not know anything about the official History would think without a doubt that the past of the Hebrew State was recent.

Are you talking about the Middle Ages? No. It tells us about the Hebrew State of the first Biblical Temple. Or yes, perhaps it also tells us about the Middle Ages, without saying it openly. As has been said, he does not deny it either, and leaves the door open to formulate this hypothesis. To understand it well, you just have to read carefully what is said, without biblical references. Spinoza places the reader in the Bible, but you have to pay close attention to what it says. If you know how to see, it speaks of what we officially call the Middle Ages. With the criticism of the breaking of the social pact between monarchs (princes and later kings), pontiff and representatives of the Ministry of State, made up of citizens, Spinoza complains of the manifest imperfection of a fragile power that is based on the idea of ​​God, but then it gets corrupted. Undoubtedly, it deals with the profound crisis of powers that has plagued all of Europe in a special way since the 16th century, without saying it openly. Spinoza laments the loss of control of the initial fragile balance, in which citizens become equals before the prince and the high pontiff, to maintain the established consensus with a good government and laws adapted to tradition. Within this genuine State no one is superior to others before God, nor does any prince excel anyone by his nobility or by right of blood (p. 373). But all are needed, as long as they authorize the power of God, the natural law, and know how to differentiate it from the human law, proper to the States. All the princes of the Hebrews were associated by religious bond (p. 372), just like medieval Christian princes. This is the root of the pious nations of God, just as it happens throughout the Europe of the Christian Middle Ages. But at a certain point it goes into crisis.

In the genuine state or as originating as (or rather accepted or) occurs with medieval counties, and the kingdoms, the rulers are rulers elected by the people, to the extent undertake to comply with the law, and the pontiff s They interpret the Law of God to follow, following the sacred precepts transcribed by Moses, which the people acclaim. Distributed in this particular order, the pontiff s not legislate or princes. It is done jointly through chosen magistrates, representative of the people, following compliance with the Law of God, which becomes the precept to be followed. The armies themselves are powers of the citizens, faithful to the Law of God, which are due to the defense of peace that protects them against any threat. They are not mercenaries, much less foreigners. Soldiers are legions or armies of God faithful to a certain state of which they are part. In other words, the figure of God creates the code or veneration of the State over all its ministers and representatives, and its armies. It is clear that Spinoza makes explicit reference to the political and religious order of the Middle Ages, in which armies serve God in the form of chivalric orders of religious and military vocation at the same time. The love of citizens for the country is not only love, but pity (p. 374). Solomon’s Order of the Temple is the first thing that comes to mind (and the Kingdom of Jerusalem).

But, as Spinoza points out, in this order based on the Law of God, unfortunately, several weaknesses are felt. On the one hand, despite this piety, an inevitable disapproval also prevails, which leads to hatred towards other nations that do not conform to this worldview. On the other hand, this balance is transitory, and the rulers seek to perpetuate their power, and the pontiffs, corrupting the law. As a result, he laments the tendency to discredit each other as a power strategy. If it is necessary, challenging one’s religion, the princes, the pontiff or encouraging the sedition of citizens, as well as their confrontation by manipulating reality.

In this way, the original State inevitably suffers successive crises, derived from its own competition from within and outside the nations. None of the three powers: the prince, the pontiff and the citizenry, cannot and does not know how to govern in the long term without avoiding the temptation to abuse their power, when they feel threatened. When this happens, an unsolvable conflict is created, to the extent that the Law of God, the State and religion (that is, the values ​​of equity and charity) are endangered, which holds everything together. Along these lines, Spinoza emphasizes that obedience to God, from the moment it is dictated, has been delegated to a human representative, such as Moses, who is granted great powers, and the option of a government without a prince nor pontiff becomes a chimera. In fact, it highlights that it has never been achieved. From the first day that God dictated the Law to Moses, the people chose a ruler, who would take care of making them an intermediary before God, and, from the time of Moses, the figures of princes and that of the high pontiff were created different powers in equilibrium subject to the Law of God, in which the people participate from their consciousness of inalienable equality before God. Spinoza refers to the experience of the Hebrew State, understood as a communion of citizen structures governed by themselves, with princes subject to a high pontiff, since the Israelites conquer Canaan and the twelve tribes (of Israel) are divided equally this territory. And it reminds us that citizens, to govern in peace, they have not yet learned to live without the authority of God delegated to the princes and the Popes.

According to Spinoza, the government of a state made up solely of citizens, after a bloody rebellion, ends up electing a tyrant, not spontaneously, but out of necessity, as History shows. And it gives the examples of the English and Roman peoples. It does not say what year it is, however, it leaves the clues to replay the dates in the official History. Looking at the immediate eyes, it would seem that it should refer to contemporary events with the thread of this story, but it is not. Official History understands the events of the English in the 16th century, and those of the Romans cited by Spinoza assimilate them to the History of the Romans before Christianity, from the 8th to the 1st century BC. He then equates the counts of Holland with the Hebrew princes, while the Dutch people have always had the right (like the Catalan) to reserve the authority to admonish the counts about their duties, as well as the power to defend their authority. and the freedom of citizens to take revenge on them, if they degenerated into tyrants. And remember the case when an earl tried, unsuccessfully. Even (just like the Catalans) the Dutch counts cannot do anything without the approval and approval of the Dutch state. That is to say, making an (apparent) historical parable, Spinoza gives us the 8th century BC in the Middle Ages, and connects it with the 16th century.

Baruch Spinoza lets us know that the Hebrew State has entered into crisis not long ago, like medieval States, due to a destabilization of the peace, sometimes caused by the ambition of the princes and other times by that of the pontiffs, but also by that of the pontiffs. own citizens. And it calls for a return to the origin, which demands to completely recompose and rethink the sacred texts, that is, History. Even its chronology (p. 250). It tells us, with implicit obviousness, that medieval History was different, as was that of the Hebrew peoples, and that it must be found by making a fusion. Wow, (seen like this) he does an extraordinary job, which incorporates an intention not manifest: to denounce the deliberate manipulation of ancient and biblical stories, which in turn makes them very current.

Recapitulating, Spinoza laments what has been done with the Bible, and calls for a return to its original meaning. In a way, he denounces that it is a mistake, although he sees the real story that has been distorted. And this perception, when it does not cite in the Middle Ages, nor the manifest duplicity between the birth of the Hebrew nations, with their princes and pontiff; and the birth of the Christian nations, with their princes and the pontiff, Christians, … brings us closer to an enigmatic evidence that, perhaps, has an explanation. Everything invites us to give force to the idea that is put on the table here: Does Spinoza state, based on obviousness, that the Hebrew and Christian orders are the same and coincide in time?

But what is the basis for this thesis?

There is a neochronological research, since the 1980s, that affirms the assumption of a medieval order that is actually the biblical one, and it is an idea with a foundation. And this foundation is scientific because it contains precise evidence, such as astronomical and statistical, and behind it there is an intense (and rigorous) work of contrasted documentary analysis. It is conclusive. The era of civilization and the biblical journey of liberation from the Egyptian yoke are much more recent, whatever written History says. The only drawback is that it leaves our written memory without a solid foundation and this creates a lot of disbelief. That is why it is compulsively discarded, without entering into reasons. This current is led by the Russian mathematicians Anatoly T. Fomenko (1945-present) and Gleb V. Nosovskiy (1958-present), it is called New Chronology and follows a work done by the Russian scientist Alexander Morozov (1854-1946). Morozov discovers the expansion of History prior to the sixth century of our era, and Fomenko and Nosovskiy extend it to the seventeenth century. In this process, ancient and medieval History occupy recent centuries, so in the 16th-18th centuries History is rewritten and an enormous large-scale documentary and archaeological falsification is made, for symbolic reasons, which includes numerous accumulated errors. In a parallel instance, the geographer and architect Andreu Marfull (the author of this article), reconstructs part of this history in what he calls Chronology X-185, and makes the Jews protagonists of the birth of the nation-states of Medieval Europe. Marfull, along this line, locates this arrival to the Umayyad expansion that, coming from Egypt, reaches the West with an expedition led by the leader Moses, also known as Musa Ibn Nusair, after which the princes descendants of King David arrive in the West, called Exiliarchs (in Narbonne), and from there a Jewish power flourishes that is maintained throughout the Middle Ages. In this context, Spinoza’s timeless book becomes one more piece that points in that direction. It is very suggestive, since it contemplates the reasonable thesis that the Jewish power appears there, not before, after Moses, but it places it in a time and in a place that the official biblical historical logic rejects. To avoid this contrast, Spinoza chooses to speak without contradictory time, and that everyone understands it as they want, but he also gives us another clue: he tells us that the Bible does not refer to the facts and centuries that the official History claims to have. Thus, the hypothesis is confirmed. Nothing denies it. On the contrary, it reinforces it.

If the neochronological glasses are not wrong, Spinoza agrees with the search known as the New Chronology of Fomenko and Nosovskiy, and refines towards the reconstruction made by the X-185 line. The medieval Christian princes were perhaps not Christians, nor were the High Pontiffs, but Hebrews.

… in the 9th century (says the official story) Charlemagne invited a Jewish community to Narbonne, known as the Exiliarchs of Babylon (it could only refer to Cairo), who made themselves known as descendants of King David. They came as princes, after the arrival of the Egyptian chieftain named Moses, also known as Musa Ibn Nusair. Then, coincidentally, after Charlemagne, almost all the medieval nations of Europe were born and they do so following the pattern of the division of powers of the ancient biblical Hebrew states. Behold, who knows … perhaps Spinoza (or whoever he really was) (**) referred to this story thinking that they were the same, or rather knowing it, despite the invention of Christian History. (***)


(*) The book Tractatus Theologico-Politicus is (officially) original 1670, but, according to the New Chronology, in which the manipulation of dates of the books is decrypted, it is questioned that really a book 1670.

(**) The name Benedict Espinosa, insofar as it refers to the Order of Saint Benedict in Occident and the thorns of Christ, is likely to be a pseudonym with an intention: the denunciation of this order and the Passion of Christ. The Order of Saint Benedict is officially promoted by Charlemagne.

(***) See the book LA VÍA CRONOLÓGICA, in Spanish, of Andreu Marfull (2020).

Cited Bibliography

SPINOZA, B. (2012). Tractatus Theologico-Politicus. Madrid: Alianza Editorial.


Deixa un comentari

Fill in your details below or click an icon to log in:

WordPress.com Logo

Esteu comentant fent servir el compte WordPress.com. Log Out /  Canvia )

Facebook photo

Esteu comentant fent servir el compte Facebook. Log Out /  Canvia )

S'està connectant a %s